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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) draftmg 
and revision processes are under siege; critics of the Code's for-
mulat10n of fundamental rules and pnnciples are attackmg the 
conventions of the sponsors of the uniform commercial law and 
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Mary. Professor Alces IS a member of the Amencan Law Institute (ALI) and the 
Amencan Bar Association (ABA). He IS the Association of Amencan Law Schools 
(AALS) LiaISon to the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 ReVISion Committee. He 
represents the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) at 
meetings of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 ReVISion Committee. He does 
not represent that group at the meetings of the Article 9 Revision Committee. The 
views expressed m thIS Article are those of the Authors alone and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the ALI, ABA, AALS, or AIAM. The Authors are grateful to 
Professor Robert Hillman for h1S comments on an earlier draft of thIS Article. 
** Professor of Law, Widener Umversity School of Law. Professor Fnsch is a 
member of the ABA and ALI. He IS the ABA adVISor to the UCC Article 2 ReVISion 
Committee. 
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the deliberat10ns of the study and draftmg committees charged 
with modermzmg the commercial law 1 Tins Article responds 
to the mdictment leveled by two particularly mfluential crit-
ics-Dean Robert E. Scott2 and Professor Alan Schwartz3-as 
their work relates to the current proJect to reVIse Article 9 of 
the Code concernmg "Secured Transact10ns"-loans agamst 
collateral.4 
While the Umform Commercial Code draftmg and reVIsion 
processes may be flawed, obscunng deficiencies m the status quo 
by discovenng "false positives" frustrates rather than serves the 
crucial goal of accomplishmg meanmgful reform. Ultimately, 
commentators who mIS1dentify deficiencies mask real shortcom-
mgs and, m fact, may exacerbate the problems of the current 
system. 
Each of the Authors has been mvolved m Uniform Commer-
cial Code draftmg and reVIs10n proJects over the course of the 
last fifteen years.5 The actors and entities responsible for mam-
taimng the mtegrity of the system have not conspired to formu-
late rules that perpetrate mJustice. In fact, a trend seems to 
have ansen toward greater balance m the commercial law than 
has ever before been realized m Anglo-Amencan JUTISprudence. 
1. See, e.g., Connne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or 
Who Is Saving the UCC?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, Inter-
est Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Donald J. Rapson, Who 
Is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in 
the Light (and Shadows) of Professor Rubin's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 
(1994); Edward L. Rubm, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some 
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 
(1993). 
2. Dean, Lewis F Powell, Jr., Professor of Law, and Arnold H. Leon Professor of 
Law, Uruversity of Virgirua. 
3. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
4. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legisla-
tures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 
VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994). 
5. The Authors are members of the ALI and the ABA and have participated m 
those groups' deliberations concerning revision of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Professor Alces was the Chair of the ABA Task Force studying the Article 9 Filing 
System. Professor Frisch 1s the ABA's advisor to the Article 2 Revision Committee. 
As counsel to the AIAM, Professor Alces has attended the meetings of the Article 2 
Rev1s10n Committee. 
1996] UCC REVISION PROCESS 1219 
This Article takes account of the forces that shape reVIs1ons of 
the commercial law and notes the relationship between those 
forces and the tenor of the resultmg codification; Part II peruses 
Scott's thesis. It responds to his criticism of the UCC draftmg 
and reVIsion processes and describes how uniform commercial 
law Jurisprudence reveals the mcongruities m his analysis. Part 
III tests Scott's conclusions about pnvate legislatures6 by con-
sidenng the realist Jurisprudence of the UCC and compares the 
UCC's "pnvate legislature" (PL) commercial law to the commer-
cial-law product of a "public legislature," the Bankruptcy Code 
promulgated by the United States Congress. Part IV focuses on 
the aspects of the Article 9 reVIsion that Scott used to illus-
trate the operation of the Schwartz and Scott thesis-the filing 
system, purchase money security mterests, and proceeds of 
collateral.7 
II. THE SCO'IT THESIS IN A NUTSHELL 
Scott argues that special mterests dommate uniform commer-
cial law reVIsion because the process lacks the system of checks 
and balances proVIded by public legislatures.8 ReVIsion efforts 
therefore develop commercial law that serves those special mter-
ests at the expense of constituencies impotent to protect their 
nghts.9 Scott endeavors to substantiate his criticism of the pn-
vate legislatures that compose the Uniform Commercial Code by 
reVIewmg the draft proVIsions of reVIsed Article 9, specifically 
the sections that proVIde "Rules That Advantage Financmg In-
siders"10 and Article 9 filing system rules "That Advantage Less 
Informed Creditors."11 According to Scott, the measure of UCC 
6. Scott, supra D,ote 4, at 1810-22. 
7. Id. at 1829-38. 
8. Because Article 9 regulates asset-based financers, a paradigmatic example 
of well-orgamzed and cohesive mterests, the process is susceptible to 
disproportionate mfluence by a smgle active mterest group representing 
particular financmg mterests. In such a case, I suggest that the law 
revision process will tend to propose rules that are both transactionally 
efficient and distributionally favorable to the dommating mterests. 
Id. at 1850. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1795. 
11. Id. at 1799. 
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draftmg mequity is the extent to which those two sections vmdi-
cate special mterests at the expense of parties who would be 
better represented m a public legislature. 12 This section will 
first treat the prermses supporting Scott's critique of the pnvate 
legislature model of UCC revision. 
A. "Logrolling Is Very Difficult"13 
Scott describes "logrolling" as the practice of legislators' trad-
mg one legislative provision for another.14 For example, m a 
public legislature, a representative from a tobacco state rmght 
agree to support public transportation funding for a state with a 
concentrated urban population m return for the urban 
legislator's prormse to vote agamst mcreased cigarette taxes. 
Logrolling makes no claim to moral supenority over other ways 
of reaching an agreement, but it does provide a means of getting 
things done. Scott argues that the pnvate legislators mvolved m 
UCC draftmg processes "cannot typically resolve disputes by 
agreemg to trade one Article 9 provis10n for another."15 He 
does acknowledge, however, the possibility of trade-offs within 
particular provisions.16 
Scott's descnpt1on of this type of "trade" does not address the 
fairness of the rule that results from a regime with no, or less, 
logrolling. Logrolling m public legislatures may serve the mter-
ests of legislators by pleasmg the constituencies that will vote 
to keep them m office but may do little or perhaps nothing to 
improve the broader society A net societal loss might well re-
sult if Virgima farmers grow and sell more tobacco, even though 
New York obtams funding for public transportation proJects. 
Assummg that the transportation funding is a good idea, it is 
difficult to see why more people should die of cancer at substan-
tial cost to nonsmokers so that New York can obtain that fund-
mg. Indeed, if that type of qmd pro quo is the hallmark of a 
12. See id. at 1830-31. 
13. Id. at 1812. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. The lustocy of commercial-law drafting, if it proves anything, proves that 
the ALI and the National Conference of Comm1ss1oners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) do get things done. 
16. Id. 
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public legislature, the UCC pnvate legislature model rmght well 
be preferable. 17 
Even assuming that logrolling rmproves the legislative pro-
cess, consider Scott's conclusion, without citation of any authon-
ty whatsoever, that pnvate legislators will make trades withm 
provisions but will not trade one provision for another.18 That 
matter of form should not deterrmne substance. For example, 
under Scott's pesslllllstic view of special mterests, would not a 
manufacturer of goods for ultimate sale to consumers be mclined 
to trade the scope of warranty protection for the substance of 
warranty protection? That is, if the warranty section says that 
buyers may recover consequential damages from sellers upon 
certam types of breach, why would an adjustment to the warran-
ty disclarmer provisions not vindicate seller mterests? 
Scott's arguments m support of ms logrolling conclusion are 
not convmcmg. He suggests that study group members work on 
discrete projects and are not m a position to trade, for example, 
a sales provision for a secured transactions provision: "Study 
groups are asked to draft smgle projects and are disrmssed when 
the projects are completed."19 In fact, many of the same people 
are active m more than one UCC revision project, either as 
members of study committees or as participants m the open 
draftmg committee meetings.20 Of course, that degree of partici-
pation does not necessarily guarantee more balanced legislation, 
but it does ensure that the attorney argumg for a particular 
provision m one enactment is considerate of that provision's 
17. For a companson of the congressional lawmakmg process with the NCCUSL 
model, see Carlyle C. Ring, The UCC Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 LoY. L.A. 
L. REV. 287, 305-07 (1994). 
18. Scott, supra note 4, at 1812. 
19. Id. 
20. Because the NCCUSL and the ALI concern themselves with more than JUSt 
the commercial law, not all of the members of those groups are active ~ the com-
mercial-law projects. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 600-02 (describmg the 
makeup and procedures of the ALI and NCCUSL); see also HANDBOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-EIGHTH YEAR 35-50 
(William S. Hem & Co. 1994) (listing members of all of NCCUSL's special com-
mittees). Therefore, a limited number of NCCUSL commissioners and AEI members 
have a particular mterest m the UCC and compnse either the drafting or adVIsory 
committees. 
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cooperation with parallel provis10ns. While an actual "trade" 
may not occur-for example, the exchange of.a commercial mter-
est provis10n for a consumer mterest section ma different arti-
cle-more coordinat10n exists between parallel enactments than 
Scott acknowledges.21 
Scott's most glaring error with regard to the composition of 
draftmg committees relates to the expertise of the committee 
members: "Draftmg committee members, however, are chosen 
because they are 'experts,' not because they represent the larger 
bodies, and the larger bodies have almost no v01ce m selectmg 
the committee members or the reporters."22 Of course, it would 
be cunous mdeed if the members of legislative draftmg commit-
tees were selected for their ignorance rather than for their gen-
eral familiarity with the commercial law 23 Further reason ex-
ists, however, to consider skeptically Scott's observations. 
The members of the Uniform Commercial Code draftmg com-
mittees are selected from the membership of the NCCUSL, an 
organization compnsed of political appomtees.24 Evidence sug-
2i. To a considerable extent, this coordination results from a blurring of the lines 
that distinguish the scope of parallel commercial enactments. For example, although 
Article 2 of the UCC applies to the sale of goods, Article 2A applies to leases of 
personal property. Many of the prov1s10ns m the two articles track one another, and 
the comments to Article 2A acknowledge when it departs from the sales law formu-
lation of a rule to conform Article 2A with leasmg practices. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-
201 cmt. (1994): 
Changes: This section is modeled on Section 2-201, with changes to re-
flect the differences between a lease contract and a contract for the sale 
of goods. In particular, subsection (l)(b) adds a reqwrement that the 
writing "describe the goods leased and the lease term," borrowmg that 
concept, with rev1s1ons, from the prov1s1ons of Section 9-203(1)(a). Subsec-
tion (2), relymg on the statutory analogue m Section 9-110, sets forth the 
m1rumum criterion for satisfymg that reqwrement. 
Id. This comment also reveals the relationship among the sales, lease, and personal 
property security regimes of the UCC. Further, the commentary to other Article 2A 
prov1s1ons concernmg consumer protection cites analogous Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code proV1s1ons. See, e.g., id. §§ 2A-108 to -109. 
22. Scott, supra note 4, at 1812-13. 
23. For a discussion of the benefits of expertise m the drafting of commercial 
legislation, see Ring, supra note 17, at 306-07. 
24. Scott, supra note 4, at 1805. Dean Scott erroneously asserts that the more 
than 300 Comm1ss1oners that comprise the NCCUSL are "appomted on a nonpolitical 
basis." Id. at 1804. Insofar as elected political officials m the states, most often the 
governors, appomt the commissioners, no reason exists for believmg that the same 
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gests that the members of the draftmg committees are selected, 
to an extent, on the basis of the geographic diversity that they 
will bnng to the proJect.25 That select10n critenon is crucial to 
the enactment effort once the proJect is fl.rushed. Legislatures m 
the different regions of the country are more likely to enact 
legislation beanng the impnmatur of drafters who have their 
region's parochial mterests m mmd. 
In addition, Scott is not completely accurate when he says 
that the members of the draftmg committees are experts. The 
members of the draftmg committees for Articles 2 and 9 are not 
the leading sales and secured transactions attorneys m the coun-
try To a considerable extent, they are representatives of differ-
ent legal perspectives rather than leading commercial-law schol-
ars.26 The membership of these committees was set when Scott 
wrote his article, but he offers no concrete examples to support 
his maccurate generalizations. 
B. "PL Members Act As Individuals and Have No Independent 
Political Power'127 
Scott pomts out that the NCCUSL and the ALI are not politi-
cal orgaruzat10ns m the partisan sense.28 He concludes, there-
fore, that the ALI and the NCCUSL "need mterest group sup-
port, or at least the absence of mterest group opposit10n, to en-
political considerations that dnve gubematonal appointments generally do not dictate 
these appointments. Dean Scott offered no support, anecdotal or othel"Wlse, for his 
assertion that officials make these political appointments on a nonpolitical basis. 
25. For example, consider the geographic diversity of the members of the Article 9 
Revision Committee: William M. Burke, Chair, California; William S. Arnold, Arkan-
sas; Manon Benfield, California; Trudi Bird, Connecticut; Dale G. Higer, Idaho; Wil-
liam C. Hillman, Massachusetts; Randal C. Picker, Illino1S; Donald J. Rapson, New 
Jersey; Harry C. Sigman, California; Bradley Y. Smith, New York; Edwin E. Smith, 
Massachusetts; Sandra S. Stem, New York; Steven L. Harris, Reporter, Illinois; 
Charles W Mooney, Reporter, Pennsylvania. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9. PARTS 4 AND 5 (WITH CONFORMING AND 
MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 1-102, 9-105, AND 9-318) (Draft, Feb. 10, 
1995). 
26. On the Article 2 Committee, for example, Commissioner Langrock frequently 
raises ISsues of concern to tnal lawyers, and Professor Spanogle is an international 
business law scholar. 
27. Scott, supra note 4, at 1813. 
28. Id. 
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sure the passage of their proposals by state legislators."29 That 
observation certamly is accurate and is borne out by UCC expe-
rience, particularly m the case of enactments that would order 
the rights of strong constituencies versus the mterests of weaker 
groups.30 Strong and well-orgamzed mterest groups, such as 
banks, would be m a posit10n to block state enactment of com-
mercial legislation perceived as too mdulgent of the rights of 
less orgamzed and, therefore, less powerful mterest groups, such 
as consumers and small busmess mterests. 31 
This asymmetry between the mfluence of groups on opposite 
sides of the debate over commercial legislation has frustrated 
the uniform commercial law from the time of Karl Llewellyn's 
VISIOn of the UCC.32 That the NCCUSL and the ALI have done 
any worse JOb m adjusting for that asymmetry than have more 
"political" mstitutions, such as the United States Congress, is 
not at all clear.33 Such a comparison is the test of the UCC 
draftmg process. 
C. "There Are Information Asymmetries Between PL Committees 
and Study Groups and the Membership at Large'rJA 
According to Scott, the members of the NCCUSL and ALI 
draftmg committees are "experts" m the area of law that is the 
subJect of the committees' deliberations.35 That conclusion is 
29. Id. at 1813-14. 
30. Consider, m tlus regard, the conclusions of Professors Beutel and Gilmore with 
regard to the ongmal Article 4 of the UCC. Fredenck K Beutel, The Proposed Uni-
form [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 361-62 (1952) 
(clamung that Article 4 "was drafted entirely with the purpose of protecting the 
banks so that they could carry on their busmess at the nsk of the customer" and 
calling it "a deliberate sell-out to the bank lobby"); Grant Gilmore, The Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 376 (1952) (argumg 
that "[s]ection 4-103 goes far beyond what lS wise or permissible m allowing banks 
to rewrite the law their way whenever things get tough"). 
31. See Beutel, supra note 30; Gilmore, supra note 30. 
32. For a descnption of and commentary on Llewellyn's mvolvement m the draft-
mg of the UCC, see Eugene F Mooney, Old Kontract Pnnciples and Karl's New 
Kode: An Essay on the Junsprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 
213 (1966). 
33. See infra part III.B. 
34. Scott, supra note 4, at 1814. 
35. Id., see supra notes 22-25 and accompanymg text. 
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sometlnng of an overstatement and, as well, is rmsleading m its 
construct10n of the term "expertise." Scott also states that be-
cause the members of the pnvate legislatures of the ALI and the 
NCCUSL know little about the subJect matter of the draftmg 
committees' work, they are at the mercy of the members of the 
draftmg committee and cannot reach mformed conclusions on 
their own. 36 
Scott does not cite the composition of any particular draftmg 
committee to support tlns portion of Ins critique. 37 If he had 
considered carefully the memberslnp of particular draftmg com-
mittees, he likely would have found a combmation of experts on 
discrete subtopics witlnn the scope of the draftmg proJects and 
generalists familiar with a maJority of the legal contexts affected 
by the draft law He also would have found that both the ALI 
and NCCUSL committees mcluded members with no particular 
expertise m the subJect matter of the draft.38 Presumably, they 
are appomted because they serve as effective bellwethers to 
mdicate the strategic strong pomts of the draft not Immediately 
accessible to the sponsonng orgamzations' memberslnp-at-large. 
Semority does not deterrmne the memberslnp of the draftmg 
committees, although effective service on other committees does 
matter. Why memberslnp based on representation of an mterest 
group-certamly the case with congressional committees-would 
yield better, more balanced law than would memberslnp based 
on the critena applied by the ALI and the NCCUSL is not im-
mediately clear. 
Scott concludes that the members of a PL "unlike members of 
a typical legislature have little mcentive to become more 
educated before voting."39 That assertion follows from Scott's 
observation that 
the typical umnformed PL member seeks to maxnmze the 
36. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1814 ("[T]he median PL member knows little about 
the subject matter of any particular drafting project."). 
37. See zd. at 1814-15. 
38. The Reporter for the ongmal Article 3 of the UCC, Professor William Prosser, 
was appomted to that position precisely because he would not bnng any biases to 
the process. Saia Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 537, 542 
(1982). He was a torts scholar and not an expert m commercial paper law. Id. 
39. Scott, supra note 4, at 1814. 
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public good (as she conceives of it) subJect to several con-
stramts: (1) that her pnvate mterest-for example, her law 
practice-is not directly unpaired; (2) that her reputat10n for 
, good Judgment is not unpaired; and (3) that she spends little 
tune on PL busmess.40 
The result of that state of affairs, Scott asserts, is model law 
consistent with the position of the most promment mterest 
group.41 Alternatively, when competit10n exists between two 
mfluential mterest groups, either mamtenance of the status quo 
or an accommodation of the conflicting positions may result.42 
Scott reaches those conclusions without reference to any particu-
lar issue, controversial or otherwise, treated on the floor of the 
annual meetmgs of the ALI or the NCCUSL. In fact, Scott's 
description of the process is not consistent with the Authors' 
impressions of both groups' annual meetings. Members who take 
issue with a draft's treatment of a matter distribute position 
papers, and real, substantial debate takes place concerning the 
drafters' accommodation of divergent views.43 The processes as 
40. Id. at i814-15. Scott would do well to heed Carlyle Ring's warrung that 
it should not be forgotten that ultimately each uniform act must be en-
acted state-by-state, and thus 15 subJected to review by experts and mter-
ested members of the public m that process. But if the NCCUSL has 
done its JOb well, the commiss10ners from each state have worked to 
make the act suitable for enactment m their state, and recogruzmg that 
uniformity must be a compromise consensus that grows from diversity of 
thought and expenence, the act should be appropnate for enactment 
without amendment. 
Ring, supra note 17, at 307. 
41. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1790. 
42. Id. at 1815. 
43. See Harry C. Sigman, Improving the UCC Revision Process: Two Specific Pro-
posals, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 326 n.9 (1994) ("I note with pnde that the Califor-
ma Bar UCC Committee delivered to an NCCUSL annual meeting a paper 
advocating repeal of Article 6 I believe that paper was highly mfluential m 
persuading the Conference the followmg year to adopt that proposal."). Carlyle Ring 
has observed that: 
From its earliest days, the practice of the NCCUSL has been to read 
word-by-word every section of the draft and to discuss the draft section-
by-section at a mmimum of two annual meetings. For mstance, Article 
4A was read at three annual meetings, consummg substantial floor time 
with questions, comments, and motions from the floor on specific ele-
ments. Similarly, at the annual meeting of the ALI m 1989, the draft 
was considered by the full membership of the ALI for their mput, ques-
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they are currently constituted are not a panacea, but Scott's 
conclusions lack a realistic referent. 
D. "Members of the Drafting Committees and Study Groups 
Tend To Have Stronger Preferences for Revision Than the 
Median PL Member'>44 
Scott asserts that both acadermc1ans and the members of 
draftmg committees, who necessarily, m ms view, represent 
mterest groups, favor revision over mamtenance of the status 
quo. 45 The draftmg committee members who represent mterest 
groups seek legislation that will skew the law m favor of their 
constituents, and acadermcs favor revision because it gives them 
something to write about, wmch 1s, after all, what acadermcs do 
for a living.46 The two prongs of that conclus10n are fatally 
flawed. First, Scott offers no concrete emp1ncal evidence to es-
tablish that members of the draftmg committees represent mter-
est groups favoring revision.47 In fact, the mterest groups that 
would be profoundly affected by any revision of Article 2 neither 
have representatives on the draftmg committees nor any demon-
strated enthusiasm for revision of Article 2.48 Further, Scott's 
tions, and critique. 
Ring, supra note 17, at 298. 
44. Scott, supra note 4, at 1815. 
45. Id. at 1815-16. Sitting Judges also participate as members of drafting commit-
tees. See Ring, supra note 17, at 294. The mterest group served by the Judiciary is 
not clear, and Scott does not make it any clearer. 
46. "[Academics] have an mstitutional commitment to reform because most law 
professors earn reputations by writing articles about how the law can be improved, 
rather than by defending the status quo." Scott, supra note 4, at 1816. 
47. See ui. at 1816-22. 
48. The correspondence to the Article 2 Revision Committee from the large manu-
facturing mterests has urged the Committee to mamtam the status quo and not to 
disturb the fundamental commercial practices that have evolved smce the promulga-
tion of the ongmal UCC. See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Altier, Vice President & 
Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Retail Fed'n, to Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State 
Laws (Apr. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Carl Edwards, Jr., Lennox 
Int'l Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners of 
Uniform State Laws (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Steven C. 
Hoffman, Semor Corporate Attorney, Caterpillar, Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive 
Secretary, Uniform Law Comm'ners (Dec. 14, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter 
from Darnel L. Jaffe, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc., to Members of the Conference 
(July 24, 1995) (on file with Authors); Letter from Frank T. Judge III, Assistant 
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conclusions about the motives of acadermcians are cyrucal. He 
fails to appreciate that law teachers can write as much about 
what 1s wrong with the law as they can about revisions of the 
law 
Despite the defic1enc1es of his prermses, however, Scott's con-
clusion 1s not off the mark; drafting committees prefer domg 
something over domg nothing. That tendency, however, may 
well reflect nothing more than their perception of madequac1es 
m the current law and an estimation of their ability to rmprove 
the law There 1s simply no reason to believe that the urge to 
reform 1s a function of mterest group pressure or acadermc ef-
forts to make work. 
Notwithstanding his perceptions of mterest group and aca-
dermc motives, Scott concludes that the outcome of most PL 
processes will be a conservative a<;ljustment of the status quo, 
unless the members of the drafting committee can convince the 
members of the ALI and the NCCUSL that the current law 
warrants more aggressive changes.49 That really 1s a 
nonconclus1on, m that it says nothing about the PL process that 
meamngfully distingmshes it from the public lawmakmg pro-
cess. It also does nothing to reveal any madequacy m the ALI 
and the NCCUSL as mstruments of commercial-law revision. 
Gen. Counsel & Assistant Secretary, Timex Corp., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive 
Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 22, 1994) (on 
file with Authors); Letter from D.G. Lautz, Seruor Counsel, Modine Mfg. Co., to 
Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform 
State Laws (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Charles H. Lockwood, 
II, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of Int'l Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., to 
Members of the Drafting Comm. of UCC ReV1Sed Article 2 (Mar. 3, 1995) (on file 
with Authors); Letter from George S. Pappayliou, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Tomkins 
Indus., Inc., to Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, Nat'! Conference of Comm'ners 
on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with Authors); Letter from Jill Steps, 
Gen. Counsel, & Mitch Eisenberg, Attorney, Burntly Corp., to Edith 0. Davies, Exec-
utive Secretary, Nat'! Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform Laws (Dec. 21, 1994) (on 
file with Authors). 
49. Scott, supra note 4, at 1816. 
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III. TESTING SCOTT'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE PRIVATE 
LEGISLATURE AND COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION 
From the foregomg prermses, Scott concludes that the PL 
process is more susceptible to the mfluence of mterest groups 
than is the public lawmakmg process.50 Presumably, then, Con-
gress and the state legislatures would devise better commercial 
law than do the ALI and the NCCUSL. 
A. "Precision" in the Uniform Commercial Code 
Scott asserts that the way to test for the presence of a dorm-
nant mterest group and the permc1ous effects of that group on 
the PL process is to look for "precise, clear, bnght-line rules" m 
the draft legislation. "[P]rec1se rules reduce the mdustry's costs 
of compliance with the rules, and, if they are rules that help 
the mdustry, give the mterpreters of the rules (i.e., Judges) less 
ability to read the rule m a way contrary to the mdustry's 
interest."51 
Aspects of that argument are, mdeed, cunous. Certamly, a 
dormnant mterest group will not favor a bnght-line rule that 
operates m a manner mcons1stent with the group's mter-
est-such as a rule that mvalidates a disclaimer of liability for 
personal mJury 52 None of the position papers submitted to the 
Article 2 Revision Committee so far, however, obJects to that 
rule m the current version of Article 2. Further, m certain cir-
cumstances, a dormnant mterest group will favor a more flexible 
standard than that provided by a bnght-line rule, as m the case 
of the subJective good faith standard m negotiable instruments 
law Financial mstitutions m favor of maintaimng the subJective 
standard argued that the adoption of an obJective standard 
would freeze commercial practices.53 Bnght-line rules or even 
50. Id. at 1817. 
51. Id. at 1819. 
52. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1994) ("Consequential damages may be limited or ex-
cluded unless the limitation or exclusion lS unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for IDJury to the person m the case of consumer goods lS pnma 
fac1e unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial lS not."). 
53. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812-13 (1958). 
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JUSt bnghter-Iine rules-demanding obJective rather than subJec-
tive good faith-do not always operate m favor of dommant 
mterest groups. 54 Reliable conclusions about whom the rule 
favors depend on the operation of the rule (as well as on the 
operation of more ostensibly flexible alternatives). 
A more fundamental mcongruity plagues Scott's conclusion. 
The rule that appears more flexible may mdeed better afford 
transactional certamty A court confronted with an ostensibly 
certam rule that the court deems mconsistent with its own con-
ception of immanent Justice will do violence to the statutory 
prescnption or ignore the statutory language altogether.55 Con-
sider, for example, the provision m the ongmal version of Article 
3 msulatmg depositary banks·from liability for conversion when 
they cashed checks beanng forged mdorsements.56 The Code 
protected the depositary m a manner that clearly made many 
courts uncomfortable. Several decisions did not consider the 
statutory formulation, which clearly favored banks.57 When Ar-
ticle 3 was revised, depositary banks were no longer msulated 
from conversion liability 58 
The Article 2 expenence with unconscionability also reveals 
the relationship between bnght-Iine rules and transaction cer-
tamty Section 2-302 of the Code provides that a court may void 
an unconscionable contract or provision upon the court's finding, 
as a matter of law, that the offensive contract or provision is 
54. Id. 
55. See, e.g., Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 508 P.2d 428, 431-33 (Or. 1973) 
(holding that a bank failed to act according to reasonable commerCial standards 
rather than msulating the bank from liability for conversion as provided by U.C.C. § 
3-419(3)). 
56. u.c.c. § 3-419(3). 
57. See, e.g, Montgomery, 508 P.2d at 431-33; Ervin v. Dauphm Deposit Trust Co., 
38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 483-84 (C.P Dauphm County 1965) (depositary bank that 
paid funds over the counter to party presenting checks bearmg forged mdorsements 
held to have paid out its own funds and to have remained m possess10n of proceeds 
of check). 
58. See U.C.C. § 3-420(c). 
A representative, other than a depositary bank, who has m good faith dealt 
with an mstrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the per-
son entitled to enforce the mstrument is not liable m conversion to that 
person beyond the amount of any proceeds that it has not paid out. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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unconsc10nable.59 The Code does not define the term "uncon-
scionable" and leaves the courts to their own devices to make 
sense of this limitation on the freedom of contract.60 Professor 
Leff criticized the unconsc1onability section as lackmg a "reality 
referent."61 In response, Professor Ellinghaus demonstrated 
that this ostensible imprec1s1on was the source of the power of 
the unconsc1onability section; the provision enables courts to 
discern the immanent Justice of a situation and reach a result 
consistent with that sense of the situation.62 Prior to the pro-
mulgation of the unconscionability rule, courts had to entertam 
msubstantial common-law contract :fictions to rule m favor of the 
contract ''vlctim."63 
Article 2A, the uniform personal property leasmg law, con-
tams an unconsc10nability provision modeled after the Article 2 
analog.64 The Article 2A provision goes further, however, and 
is more mdulgent of the nghts of the victims of predatory con-
tractmg. 65 That development is particularly noteworthy m re-
gard to Scott's conclusions about the impact of dommant mter-
est groups because transactions within the scope of Article 2A 
mvolve a dommant party-large mstitutional lessors of personal 
property Article 2 does not similarly proceed from the perspec-
tive of a smgle dommant transactor group; the large mstitu-
tional seller is also the large mstitutional buyer. So, if any-
thing, Article 2A reasonably should have a more restnctive 
rather than less restnctive unconsc10nability provision than the 
one found m Article 2. 
The foregomg treatment of the unconsc10nability pnnc1ple m 
the law of sales and leases is not mtended to demonstrate that 
commercial-law enactments are unmdulgent of particularly 
59. Id. § 2-302(1). 
60. See zd. §§ 1-201, 2-103 (failing to define the term). 
61. Arthur A. Leff, Unconsc1onability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 558 (1967). 
62. M.P Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconsc1onability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 814-15 
(1969). 
63. See zd. at 763. 
64. u.c.c. § 2A-108. 
65. Note that U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) permits a court to grant "appropnate relief' if 
another party's unconscionable conduct mduces a consumer to enter mto a lease 
contract. U.C.C. § 2A-108(~). 
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mfluential mterest groups. Certamly, the mfluence of financial 
mstitutions m payments law cannot be ignored. The pomt re-
mams, however, that Scott's analysis does not tell very much 
about the mfluence of such groups on particular commercial 
legislation. As careful consideration of his "proof' reveals, his 
"test"66 for excessive mfluence and his crit1c1sm of the ALI and 
the NCCUSL processes 1s fundamentally flawed. 
According to Scott, the mterest group model strongly suggests 
that the competitive enVIronment m which the dra:ftmg of legal 
rules takes place directly affects their character. 67 He argues 
that, "where several groups are m competition[,] the process will 
tend to generate vague, imprecise rules and ambiguous stan-
dards."68 His favopte example of the "vague and nondirective" 
rules that result from an absence of dommant mterest groups 
from the dra:ftmg process 1s Article 2.69 Within this area, Scott's 
argument for ms theory of lawmakmg processes has some mitial 
plausibility 
Unlike the various commercial actors who engage m transac-
tions governed by other articles of the Code, buyers and sellers 
of goods share substantially the same mterests. The seller m one 
Article 2 transaction 1s often the buyer m the next. The fact that 
buyers and sellers are mterchangeable from one deal to the next 
suggests that, at the time of Article 2's dra:ftmg, a smgle mterest 
group could not have dommated the pnvate lawmakers. After 
all, "Sears as buyer would not want to push too hard for fear of 
preJudicmg the mterests of Sears as seller."70 So, Article 2 1s a 
66. Scott, supra note 4, at 1822-50. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1825. 
69. Id. ("The strikmg contrast between the rules of Article 2 and those found m 
Articles 3, 4, and 9 provide [sic) a particularly salient illustration of this observation."). 
70. Peter A. Alces, Roll Ouer, Llewellyn?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 543, 544 (1993). 
Schwartz and Scott make this same pomt m Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 645 
("The effects of sales law do not fall systematically on any mterest 
group-busmesses and consumers are both buyers and sellers."). This reality and the 
fact that parties can contract out of most sales-law rules lead Schwartz and Scott to 
surmise that commercial mterest groups probably were not very active participants 
m the or1gmal deliberations over Article 2 and to predict that they are unlikely to 
take an active role m its revision. See ul. at 646. The expenence of these Authors 
mdicates otherwise. See supra note 48 and accompanymg text. Schwartz and Scott 
thus suggest that Article 2 is loaded with vague rules not because mterest groups 
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model statute that, m terms of mterest group politics71 and 
draftmg style, seems to conform to Scott's model. 
The Article 2 example does not, however, support the validity 
of Scott's model as much as he implies. His conclusion is vulner-
able to a basic obJection: it ignores the Jurisprudential theones 
of Professor Karl Llewellyn, the pnncipal drafter.72 To appreci-
ate this assertion, some background is needed. 
During the late mneteenth century, a classical Jurisprudence 
prevailed m which the law was understood to be scientific; that 
is, law was believed to be a discipline complete m itself, with 
"rules" that had a umversality and validity that were abso-
lute. 73 To proceed effectively, a court needed only to discover by 
deduction the correct rule and apply it to the issues posed m the 
dispute at hand, without regard for the practical or political con-
sequences of its application.74 From the begmmng of the twen-
tieth century, the foundations of this system of legal orthodoxy 
were under attack, first from the early Progressives 75 and, lat-
are m competition but because they are largely dismterested. See Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 4, at 645-47. 
71. No cohesive mterest group dommated the drafting process. 
72. See Mooney, supra note 32, at 223. 
Although much of the actual drafting of the various articles was 
done by committees, Llewellyn was the coordinator and, as such, exer-
clSed both tremendous mfluence and practical control over the whole 
proJect. He and Professor Corbm served on the committee drafting the 
sales article and m great measure Llewellyn wrote that section of the 
Code to suit himself. The first version was published m 1949 and al-
though there have been numerous and extensive revisions smce then, the 
sales article and the all-important mtroductory article (Article 1) retam 
most of the characterutics built mto them by Llewellyn. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
73. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 
at 4 (1992). According to Horwitz, Professor Duncan Kennedy was the first to char-
actenze this belief as "Classical Legal Thought." See id. at 3 n.1. Others have appro-
pnately called it "mechamcal Junsprudence," see Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908), and "fundamentalism," see JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND 48-56 (1930). Whatever its name, its most mfluential propo-
nent was Harvard Law School Dean Chnstopher Columbus Langdell. WILLIAM TwIN-
ING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 10 (1973). For a succmct sum-
mary of classical legal ideas, see James B. Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, 
in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS 354, 368-69 
(1913). 
74. See FRANK, supra note 73, at 8-9. 
75. Morton Horwitz marks Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), m which the 
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er, dunng the 1920s and 1930s, from the "Legal Realists."76 
These diverse theonsts shared a common skepticism regarding 
the existence of a structure of determmate and nondiscretionary 
answers to legal quest10ns. For them, law was not a structure of 
neutral and nonpolitical norms that could be disengaged from 
the realities of life. 
One of the most dramatic examples of the move away from 
classical legal thought can be seen m the law of contracts. As 
early as 1919, Professor Corbm wrote that 
law does not consist of a senes of unchangeable rules or pnn-
c1ples Every system of Justice and of nght is of human 
development, and the necessary corollary is that no known 
system is eternal. In the long history of the law can be ob-
served the birth and death of legal pnnc1ples. The law is 
merely a part of our changmg civilization. The history of law 
is the history of man and of society Legal pnnc1ples repre-
sent the prevailing mores of the time, and with the mores 
they must necessarily be born, survive for the appomted sea-
son, and pensh. 77 
The collapse of the classical model of contract at once freed the 
legal system from an archaic emphasis on categoncal thmkmg 
and foreshadowed a profound "shift m method revealed by 
the dommance of standards over rules m the processes of con-
Supreme Court used freedom of contract as a constitutional doctnne to strike down 
a maximum hours law for bakers, as the watershed event that established progres-
sive legal thinking and marked the beginning of the end of classical thought, 
HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 33-39. For a Progressive critique of Lochner, see Roscoe 
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909). The most striking tenet of the 
Progressive movement was a belief that the legal system was inseparable from exist-
ing political and social conditions. See generally id. (describing social realities that 
undermined Judicial reasoning in the freedom of contract cases of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries). 
76. The term "legal realism" has its genesis in an article by Llewellyn. See Karl 
N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 
(1930). Although realism "was neither a coherent intellectual movement nor a conslS-
tent or systematic Junsprudence," HORWITZ, supra note 73, at 169, Morton Horwitz 
explains that "above all, Realism is a continuation of the Progressive attack on the 
attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal Thought to create a sharp distinc-
tion between law and politics and to portray law as neutral, natural, and apolitical," 
id. at 170. 
77. Arthur L. Corbin, Preface to Third American Edition of WILLIAM R. ANSON, 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 1919). 
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tract formation and mterpretation."78 Into tlns settmg caine 
Karl Llewellyn. 
Llewellyn was one of the most mfluential figures m the realist 
assault on the conceptualism of the old order. 79 He believed m 
finding the law m the commercial context that gave nse to the 
dispute. Accordingly, the Judicial task was to discover tlns so-
called "immanent law " Llewellyn accepted the view that 
[e]very fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order 
can take it m, carnes withm itself its appropnate, natural 
rules, its nght law This is a natural law which is real, not 
rmagmary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on 
the solid foundation of what reason can recogmze m the na-
ture of man and of the life conditions of the time and place; it 
is thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same, 
but is mdwelling m the very circumstances of life. The high-
est task of law-givmg consists m uncovenng and rmplement-
mg this immanent law 80 
That Llewellyn assigned for lnmself the responsibility of draft-
mg Article 2 is not surpnsmg. After all, the sales construct is a 
peculiarly appropriate model for the draftmg style that 
Llewellyn had m mmd. Unlike the. other articles of the Code, 
Article 2 contemplates an essentially bipartite transaction be-
tween a seller and a buyer. Third parties may play a role, but 
their participation is essentially mmor.81 In the sales context, 
the values of certamty and predictability are able to take a 
78. Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
79. See generally T\VINING, supra note 73 (providing an mterpretation of 
Llewellyn's thought and its development). 
80. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960) (quoting Levm 
Goldschmidt). According to Richard Danzig: 
Llewellyn saw law as an articulation and regularization of unconsciously 
evolved mores-as a crystallization of a generally recogmzed and almost 
mdisputably nght rule (a "smgmg reason"), mherent m, but very possibly 
obscured by, existing patterns of relationships. To him an "immanent 
law" lay embedded m any situation and the task of the law authority 
was to discover it. 
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 624 (1975). 
81. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-104, -506 (1994) (financmg agency); id. §§ 2-504, -509(1), 
-705 (earner); id. §§ 2-503(4), -509(2) (bailee). 
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backseat to the need to divme and fulfill the parties' expecta-
tions created by their factual bargam.82 To accomplish this, 
Llewellyn drafted a statute that reqmres a court to familiarize 
itself with relevant commercial practices. It does this 
by utilizmg flexible standards, such as commercial reason-
ableness and good faith, rather than rules that purport to 
capture and solidify prevailing practices and norms. Each 
dispute between a seller and buyer is placed m its functional 
setting where the parties are expected to find and prove rele-
vant "habits," i.e., trade usage or practices, as part of the 
agreement. Under these standards, the court is given flexibil-
ity (at some cost to certamty and admrmstrability) to resolve 
the new or umque dispute. Moreover, standards are thought 
to reduce the gap between law and practice and to msure 
that dec1s1ons are practical and responsive to the needs, prov-
en m the particular case, of the parties and the relevant 
busmess community 83 
82. The foundation for much of Article 2 is therefore made to rest on the concept 
of "agreement." The definition provides: "'Agreement' means the bargam of the par-
ties m fact as found m their language or by implication from other circumstances 
mcluding course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance " Id. § 
1-201(3). Comment 1 to § 1-205 further remforces the notion that expectations devel-
op m the context of commercial practices. 
This Act reJects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading 
of a commercial agreement. Instead the meanmg of the agreement of the 
parties is to be determmed by the language used by them and by their 
action, read and mterpreted m the light of commercial practices and 
other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for mter-
pretation are set by the commercial context, which may explam and 
supplement even the language of a formal or final writing. 
Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1. 
This emphasis on real commercial life may, at times, undermme Article 2's 
certamty. Some find no fault m this conclusion. One of the Authors, for example, 
has argued that the open-ended drafting style of Article 2 helps guide courts toward 
the best results. See Alces, supra note 70, at 546; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1447, 1450-52 
(1994) (discussmg Article 2's flexible standards). Others, however, grimly contemplate 
the prospect of cases with unpredictable outcomes. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 80, 
at 630 ("[T]he Llewellyn approach seems paradoxically to undermme that very cer-
tamty and consistency m the law that the Uniform Commercial Code was dedicated 
to obtrumng."); Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 
(1962) ("The tastes of the practicmg lawyers who advised the draftsmen were, m 
most cases, opposed to the flexible ideas of the Chief Reporter: they preferred, they 
msisted on, a tightly-drawn statute, precise, detailed and rigid."). 
83. PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
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Seen m th.Is light, Article 2 1s a 'junsprudential statement."84 
It reflects not merely a particular view about the appropnate 
source of sales law but also, and perhaps more mterestingly, a 
distinctive theory about how cases ought to be decided. 
Llewellyn recogmzed that deciding difficult cases mvolves con-
siderations of vanous kinds. Because courts make their dec1-
s1ons after the dispute has ansen and because the common law 
focuses on mdividual cases, the common-law process has a sig-
nificant advantage over legislation m responding to changing 
conditions and mores. The sales article reflects a salutary un-
derstanding that Judges rather than legislators should make 
some Judgments of policy and pnnc1ple. In sum, Article 2 1s best 
understood and defended as a means of facilitating common-law 
decis10nmaking. A quite general conclusion emerges from th.Is 
discuss10n: the style of Article 2 1s the way it 1s because a "self-
consc1ous Junsprude" drafted it. 85 In short, good reason exists 
for doubting that the real cause of its 1mprec1s10n 1s the ability 
and willingness of mterest groups to compete m the political 
marketplace. 
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (1990) (foot-
notes omitted). The drafting approach of Article 9 is quite different. Donald Rapson 
describes the difference this way: "Compared to Article 2 which looks to the courts 
and other forums to decide disputes by applymg Article 2 pnnc1ples, Article 9 en-
deavors to prevent the disputes by antiCipating the ISsues and furmshmg answers." 
Alces, supra note 70, at 545 (quoting Letter from Donald J. Rapson, Member, Per-
manent Editonal Bd. of the UCC, to Peter A. Alces, Associate Professor of Law, 
Umversity of Alabama 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1986)). The odd thmg IS that Scott hmISelf 
suggests at least one functional distinction between Articles 2 and 9 that may ex-
plam the different drafting styles. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1799-1800 ("Article 9's 
filing system seeks to regulate the provision of mformation, leavmg the regulation of 
mISbehavior to pnvate ordenng among the parties."). Notice, however, that, when 
Article 9 attempts to regulate behavior, as it does m Part 5, it does so m a style 
sunilar to the approach taken m Article 2. See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase 
(of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of Deficumcy Actions: What Does 
Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649, 680-92 (1992-1993) (critic1zmg the 
application of the "commercial reasonableness" standard when applied m the context 
of deficiency actions). 
84. Alces, supra note 70, at 543. 
85. Danzig, supra note 80, at 621. 
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B. Commercial Legislation by Public Legislature: The 
Bankruptcy Code Experience 
No one has the data necessary to draw mtellectually defensi-
ble conclusions about patterns of special mterest group mfluence 
on both the pnvate and public lawmakmg processes. The un-
press10n that a PL is especially vulnerable to mterest group 
capture is almost certamly mcorrect. Instances m which a PL 
might have succumbed to the will of a special mterest group 
whose mterests may not comcide with the public mterest may 
provide a basis for criticism of the PL as a lawmakmg mstitu-
t10n. The issue, however, really must be: with what should the 
decisions of a PL be compared? Public legislatures are also far 
from perfect. The legislative output of public legislatures shows 
signs of mterest group mfluence no better, and perhaps far 
worse, than the mdications of such pressure seen m the product 
of PLs.86 Indeed, m light of the more complete and systematic 
evidence regarding the commercial legislation produced by pub-
lic legislatures, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that, at least 
m the area of commercial law, the ALI and the NCCUSL are 
two of our society's most reliable lawmakmg mstitutions. 
Several bodies of federal law clearly reflect the political de-
mands of special mterests. Perhaps the most promment example 
is bankruptcy law, which is so nddled with legal rules designed 
to benefit the narrow preferences of discrete mterest groups 
rather than those of the public-at-large that it has compromised 
the potential rehabilitation of many financially distressed com-
pames. 87 The followmg examples provide JUSt a small sampling 
of special mterest legislation netted from the Bankruptcy Code 
as it stood pnor to the 1994 amendments.88 
When the Supreme Court held that firms could reJect unfavor-
86. See, e.g., mfra not.es 87-107 and accompanymg text. 
87. Tlus theme has been articulated m much of the academic commentary on the 
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Damel Keating, Bankruptcy Code§ 1114: Congress' Emp-
ty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. i7, 19 (1993) ("[T]here is a 
growmg sentiment among promment members of the bankruptcy community that the 
proliferation of special mterest legislation m the Bankruptcy Code t.ends to thwart 
one of its primary functions: the financial rehabilitation of struggling compames."). 
88. For discussion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see infra not.es 99-107 
and accompanymg text. 
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able collective bargaimng agreements because they were execu-
tory contracts, 89 Congress came under immediate fire from or-
gamzed labor seekmg protective legislation.90 As a result of this 
mtense lobbymg effort, § 1113 was added to the Bankruptcy 
Code. 91 Tlns section permits a firm to escape its collective bar-
gainmg agreement only after it has engaged m elaborate negoti-
ations. 92 Admittedly, there 1s room for disagreement about 
whether this legislation comc1des with the public mterest. The 
tension between the mfluence of a special mterest group and the 
congressional response 1s, however, undemable. 
Another manifestation of the significant mfluence of a discrete 
mterest group 1s § 1114, which favors retiree claims to medical 
benefits by treating the firm's obligations as admimstrative 
expenses. 93 The result 1s that the debtor will pay these claims 
89. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The Court was 
unammous in its holding that the term "executory contract" in § 365(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code includes collective bargammg agreements. Id. at 517-27. In a narrow 
five-to-four declSlon, the Court also held that a debtor does not commit an unfair 
labor practice when it unilaterally reJects or modifies a collective bargaining agree-
ment without pnor approval of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 532-34. 
90. See William Sernn, Labor Leaders Voice Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1984, 
at D25; see also Charlene R. Ehrenwerth & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The New Bank-
ruptcy Procedures for Re1ection of Collective-Bargammg Agreements: Is the Pendulum 
Swmgmg Back, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 939, 950 (1985) (describing Congress's swift reaction 
in the wake of Bildisco); Richard H. Gibson, The New Law on Re1ection of Collective 
Bargammg Agreements m Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1984) (describing congressional deadlock over corrective legisla-
tion); Rosalind Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargammg Agreement-A 
Brief Lesson m the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 293, 312-21 (1984) (same); James J. White, The Bildisco Case and the 
Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV: 1169, 1190-98 (1984) (same). 
91. 11 u.s.c. § 1113 (1994). 
92. Essentially, § 1113 provides that a bankruptcy court may approve the reJection 
of a collective bargaining agreement only after: (1) the debtor makes a proposal that 
provides for modifications to the agreement "necessary" to permit an effective reor-
gamzation, (2) the umon reJects the proposal without good cause, and (3) the balance 
of equities clearly favors reJection of the agreement. Id. § 1113(c)(l)-(3). Tins section 
reflects "insIStent congressional effort to replace the Bildisco standard with one that 
[is] more sensitive to the national policy favonng collective bargammg agreements." 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1089 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
93. The Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 
§ 2(a), 102 Stat. 610 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1114), added § 1114 to the Bankruptcy 
Code. Daniel Keating wrote about the rmpetus behmd the law. 
Anybody even vaguely familiar with tins law knows that it was enacted 
1240 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1217 
ahead of the claims of current employees and unsecured 
creditors.94 Not surpnsmgly, many commentators with little 
sympathy for legislators subJect to mterest group pressure have 
adopted the view that this retiree legislation, dnven by one 
particular mterest group, and the rehabilitative goal of Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code are mcompatible. Leslie T. Gladstone 
put it this way· 
Special mterest legislation is becommg mcreasmgly preva-
lent under the Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11 was designed to 
balance the various competmg mterests. That delicate bal-
ance is upset by special mterest legislation. Certamly retirees 
are deservmg of protection. Equally deservmg, however, are 
tort claimants or, mdeed, low-mcome creditors as a whole. If 
Congress were to accommodate all deservmg mterests, chap-
ter ll's utility would effectively be destroyed. Congress's 
selective accommodation senously undermmes the policy 
favonng equal distribution among creditors. An overall bene-
fit can be achieved only if the various claimants share equal-
ly and refram from fightmg for preferential treatment.95 
These observat10ns about§ 1114 do not necessarily mean that 
every provis10n motivated by special mterest politics is wrong. 
The Bankruptcy Code's text and legislative history, however, 
prove that the section was a tnumph for one politically active 
group. These cons1derat1ons weigh agamst facile acceptance of 
the belief that PLs are peculiarly susceptible to mfluence by a 
dommant mterest group. 
Iromcally, at least m the realm of bankruptcy law, the phe-
m direct response to LTV Corporation's cutoff of retiree medical benefits 
when it entered chapter 11 bankruptcy m the summer of 1986. In effect, 
the new legislation told LTV and any other company with sunilar mten-
tions that they must, absent extenuating circumstances, continue to honor 
promises of medical benefits made to retirees even if the company was m 
chapter 11. 
Keating, supra note 87, at 17-18. Although the modification of retiree benefits is 
possible under a process strikmgly sunilar to the steps reqUJied under § 1113 for 
reJection of collective bargammg agreements, see supra note 92, there lS some evi-
dence that Congress mtended greater protection for retiree benefits, see Leslie T. 
Gladstone, Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988: Welfare Benefits m 
Need of Reform, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 427, 447 (1991). 
94. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503, 507, 726. 
95. Gladstone, supra note 93, at 450-51 (footnotes omitted). 
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nomenon of capture extends beyond the efforts of lobbyists for 
pnvate special mterests. When the issue was the constitutional 
status of bankruptcy Judges and the bankruptcy courts, even the 
Chief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference of 
the United States became active lobbyists.96 No one has yet 
come forward with evidence of this type of Judicial mtrus1on mto 
the pnvate legislative process. 97 
The pomt goes deeper still. Scott surmises that secured fi-
nancmg ms1ders enJOY an orgamzational advantage m dealing 
96. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lme Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy Judges, as Article I Judges, were 
without Judicial power under the Constitution to hear a Marathon-type case mvolv-
mg purely state-law 1Ssues when no basis of JurISdiction other than the Bankruptcy 
Code existed, id. at 76. These cases could only be heard by an Article III Judge with 
life tenure. Id. The practical effect of th!S dec1s10n was to undermme the entire 
JurISdictional scheme of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Congress could have provided 
the necessary constitutional fix simply by makmg the bankruptcy Judges Article III 
Judges. Th1S idea proved to be politically unfeasible. See New Court Deci-
swns-Bankruptcy, 53 U.S.L.W. 2297, 2298 (Dec. 18, 1984). Instead, Congress re-
sponded with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 
which gave the reqwsite bankruptcy Jurisdiction to Article III Judges m the distnct 
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994). Congress then provided that distnct courts can 
delegate JurISdiction to the bankruptcy courts m "cases under" the Bankruptcy Code 
and m "proceedings ansmg under or ansmg m or related to" the Code. Id. § 
157(a). Still, constitutional 1Ssues remam. See generally Vern Countryman, The Bank-
ruptcy Judges: Jurisdiction by Neglect, 92 COM. L.J. 1 (1987) (critiqumg the uncer-
tam bases for bankruptcy court Jurisdiction); Lloyd King, A Chart of Bankruptcy Ju-
risdiction for Admiralty Lawyers, 59 TUL. L. REv. 1264 (1985) (describmg procedures 
by which admiralty lawyers may avoid bankruptcy court Jurisdiction). Professor 
Countryman explams why: 
Many of the 1984 defects are doubtlessly due to the fact that too 
many special mterest cooks were stirnng the broth, each concerned with 
adding its own mgredient but without much knowledge of or mterest m 
the impact on the overall end product. Nothmg more is to be expected of 
lobbyists for the consumer credit mdustry or other pnvate mterests. But 
it IS most disturbmg that the special mterest lobbyists m th!S case m-
cluded the Chief Justice of the United States and the Judicial Conference 
of the United States. It is also most disturbmg that the one mgredient 
essential to them m any solution was that bankruptcy Judges not be 
given Article III status. 
Vern Countryman, Scrambling To Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, 
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislatiue Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 43-44 
(1985). 
97. For a recent discussion of the propnety of a Judge's participation m ALI delib-
erations and proJects, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: 
Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 25-30. 
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with pnvate legislators that is lackmg m their dealings with 
public lawmakers.98 Yet the recently enacted Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1994 paradoxically suggests a different understand-
mg of the relative ease with which this group can capture a 
public legislature. On its face, this legislation is far more hospi-
table to the mterests of secured creditors than to the needs of 
unsecured creditors.99 Many of its proVIs10ns do not merely pro-
VIde a clear statement from Congress and thus seek to promote 
pnnc1ples of consistent and certam adjudication; they represent 
a quite general effort to resolve issues ma way that systemati-
cally benefits secured parties. 100 
Examples mclude overruling the Deprizio line of cases, 101 
protecting security mterests m postpetition rents, 102 expanding 
98. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1818 ("This suggests, mter alia, that an lllStitu-
tion that functions as the ALI and NCCUSL do is sometimes easier to mfluence 
than ordinary legislatures; as a consequence, it will enact more special mterest 
legislation."). 
99. This notion apparently contradicts Scott's statement that "there is at least 
1mpress1omstic evidence that unsecured creditors, managers, and debtors had some 
role m molding the Bankruptcy Code to suit their needs, which were dnven m large 
part by the sympathetic stance toward secured creditors evident m Article 9." Id. at 
1849 n.215. 
100. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanymg text. 
101. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 
(6th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Leasmg Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robmson 
Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. 
Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (generally referred to m the bankruptcy field as 
In re V.N. Depnz10 Constr. Co.). In these cases, courts reasoned that, m situations 
mvolvmg an "insider" guarantee, the trustee has authority to recapture preferential 
payments made to undersecured and unsecured creditors a full year pnor to the 
bankruptcy filing. See Ray, 899 F.2d at 1494; Manufacturers Hanauer, 892 F.2d at 
850; Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1193-94. The new law changes the Deprizio result by add-
mg a new subsection (c) to 11 U.S.C. § 550. This provlSlon makes it clear that 
transfers made between 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition cannot 
be recovered from non-ms1der transferees. 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (1994). 
102. In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1979), the Court held that 
lenders have a security mterest m postpetition rents only to the extent that they 
have perfected their security mterest under applicable state law. Because, m many 
states, this requirement mvolves the appomtment of a receiver, creditors who failed 
to take this step have often had secured claims demed. See, e.g., In re Multi-Group 
III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re Metro Square, 93 B.R. 
990 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988), order reu'd, 106 B.R. 584 (D. Minn. 1989); In re TM 
Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 928 F.2d 
1131 (3d Cir. 1991). The Bankruptcy Code now provides for an enforceable security 
mterest m rents if the secured party has perfected the lien on the underlymg prop-
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the protection given to purchase money security mterests, 103 
broademng the exceptions to the automatic stay, 104 and en-
hancmg the rights of secured creditors m consumer bankrupt-
cies. 105 Any suggestion that the decidedly pro-secured creditor 
stance taken by the new act 1s unrelated to mterest group poli-
tics would be odd. Indeed, many of the new provisions appear to 
be a self-conscious effort to reflect a particular mterest group's 
own view of how the Bankruptcy Code ought to work. 106 
If the above assertions are true, the establishment of a Na-
tional Bankruptcy Review Commission to review the Code rmght 
be defended as a frank recognition that, at times, a study group 
sunilar to the NCCUSL model 1s umquely well situated to make 
relevant policy decisions.107 Tlns assessment 1s not a mecham-
erty and the security agreement extends to rents. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Moreover, 
sub3ect to an "equities of the case" exception, this subsection also protects a secured 
party's mterest m revenue streams generated by hotels and other lodgmg properties. 
Id. 
103. Congress amended § 547(c)(3) to provide that a trustee may not avoid as a 
preference the perfection of a purchase money security mterest if it occurs withm 20 
days of the debtor's receivmg possession of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3). Con-
gress mtended the extension of the grace penod from 10 to 20 days to conform the 
Bankruptcy Code with the prevailing version of UCC § 9-301(2). Id. § 547 (histoncal 
and reVISion notes). 
104. One important new exception mvolves "smgle asset real estate," as defined m 
§ 101(51B). A secured creditor may have the stay lifted after 90 days unless the 
debtor has filed a reasonable reorgamzation plan or has commenced monthly mterest 
payments to the creditor. Id. § 362(d)(3). Another noteworthy change is to § 1110. 
Formerly, this section permitted a creditor to ignore the automatic stay if it claimed 
a purchase money security mterest m certam types of aircraft and vessels. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1110 (1992). Congress has now broadened the scope of § 1110 to mclude all 
security mterests, not JUSt mterests obtamed to enable the debtor to acqwre the 
eqwpment. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994). 
105. Congress amended § 522(0 to prohibit debtor avoidance of nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase money security mterests m tools, animals, and crops to the extent that 
the value of such property lS m excess of $5,000. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(3) (1994). This 
new provlSion, however, applies only when the debtor has chosen or is reqwred to 
utilize the state exemptions and the state prohibits the avoidance of consensual liens 
on exempt property or state law permits exemptions without limitation m amount. 
See id. 
106. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanymg text. 
107. Title VI of the new act provides for the creation of a nme-member commission 
to study the Bankruptcy Code and make formal recommendations on needed reforms. 
See National Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147 
(codified as amended m scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Presi-
dent, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States appomt members of the 
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cal exercise to uncover general legislative supenority It calls for 
a Judgment about comparative competence, undertaken m light 
of the statutory structure and the applicable considerations of 
both fact and policy Special mterest group politics poses no 
more s1gruficant challenge to the PL process than it does to 
lawmakmg as a whole. 
IV THE FILING SYSTEM 
Scott reviewed the Article 9 revision committee's treatment of 
the filing system to prove his pomts about the failures of the 
uruform commercial law dra:ftmg process.108 In Scott's estima-
tion, the dominance of large mstitutional lenders tilts the filing 
system playmg field m favor of those lenders' mterests.109 Scott 
errs both m his understanding of the filing system rules, mclud-
mg their operation and political context, and m his conclusions 
concermng what the filing system reveals about the politics of 
Article 9 and the uniform commercial law movement. 
A. Scott on Filing System Politics 
The filing system of Article 9 is the foundation of the uniform 
personal property security law 110 Article 9 is a "race" statute 
because the first to file or otherwise perfect a collateral mterest 
m the debtor's property will have pnority over virtually all com-
Commission. Id. § 604(a). Members of Congress and the executive branch are meligi-
ble for appomtment. Id. The pnncipal benefits of the Commission seem to be a re-
duction m the mfluence of special mterest groups and a corresponding mcrease m 
the mfluence of "experts" with a greater understanding of the reorgamzation process 
and of the general thrust of bankruptcy law. See J. Vincent Aug, Jr., "A View from 
the Bench" or the Other "R" Word, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 403 (1992). 
Id. 
I think of what a powerful and prestigious review commission could ac-
complish. First of all, it could be an end to tinkenng with the Code by 
special mterest groups. These special mterest groups' understanding of 
the Bankruptcy Code almost never gets beneath the surface of 
nondischargeability of a certam type of debt or mclusion or exclusion of 
types of assets from a bankruptcy estate. If you showed these folks a 
Judicial impact statement, they wouldn't understand what you were talk-
mg about. They are very superficial m their approach. 
108. Scott, supra note 4, at 1788-90. 
109. Id. at 1785-87. 
110. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1994) (setting forth provisions for required filings). 
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petmg creditors. m The debtor and all creditors of the debtor 
thus depend on the mtegrity of the filing system. So long as the 
system works, the cost of credit should be less than if a coherent 
filing or public notice system were not m place. 
The current Article 9 filing system has been the subJect of 
substantial debate, both m acadermc and practitioner circles.112 
The committee drafting the revision of Article 9 has drawn upon 
comprehensive studies of the current filing system to fashion 
adjustments to the status quo.113 They have designed these ad-
JUstments to improve the mtegrity of the system and thereby 
lower the cost of credit by reducmg some of the nsk imposed on 
the Article 9 scheme by deficiencies m the filing system.114 In 
addition, the dra:ftmg committee has rethought the place of 
perfection by filing m the array of available and sometimes 
competing forms of perfection. 115 
Amendments to filing practices are problematic to effect for a 
number of reasons. First, a comprehensive commercial statute 
such as Article 9 cannot easily rmcromanage the mterstices of 
the filing system, a regime largely within the province of clerical 
and adrmmstrative staff at the state and local levels throughout 
the country 116 Second, the benefits of improving the system 
111. Id. § 9-301 (establishmg pnorities for certam creditors based on filing status). 
112. A recent symposmm issue of the Minnesota Law Review was devoted to the 
Article 9 filing system. Symposmm, "Managing the Paper Trail"· Evaluating and 
Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1995). 
113. PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 88 (1992) [heremafter FINAL 
REPORT); Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article 9 
Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 101-05, 115-24 (1991); see PEB STUDY GROUP, 
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 APPENDICES TO REPORT 15-136 (1992) (providing the results of 
the Article 9 Filing System Task Force's study of the current filing system). 
114. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 88. 
115. For a review of alternative perfection systems, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic 
Highway, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1992, at 5 (discussmg the possibility 
and promISe of a computenzed filing system); David M. Phillips, Flawed Perfection: 
From Possession to Filing Under Article 9 (pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1979) 
(analyzmg the considerations that have contributed to the declinmg importance of 
possession), 59 B.U. L. REV. 209 (1979) (exanumng the impact of possession on the 
Article 9 filing system). 
116. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1994) (setting forth detailed filing reqmrements, mcluding 
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are not compelling because the parties that would realize the 
greatest gams from improvement of the system have not mdicat-
ed that they have any means of effectmg the improvements. 117 
Tinrd, no consensus exists as to what would constitute real 
improvement of the system because no consensus has ansen as 
to what the system should do. 118 Fourth, the filing system 1s 
captive to the technology spiral; the available means to modern-
ize (i.e., computenze) the system multiply apace, but not all 
filing venues can afford to avail themselves of the evolvmg tech-
nologies.119 Paradoxically, the pace of advance combmed with 
the mcons1stent level of funding for new technologies withm and 
among the states means that the prospects for true uniformity of 
filing practices may be more bleak than at any time m the histo-
ry of the Umform Commercial Code. 
Any determmation of the adjustments m the filing system 
that would best serve the mterests of a particular constituency 
necessitates a commg to terms with the way m which the sys-
tem, as currently constituted, fixes the pnority of some creditors 
over others. The general rule of Article 9 1s "first to file or per-
fect wms."120 The race charactenstic of the system favors the 
vigilant and pumshes mdividuals who do not appreciate the 
system's operation and who fail to appnse themselves of the 
mformation that the system provides or to provide the mforma-
tion that the system requires. 
Agamst that "first-m-time-wms" backdrop, current Article 9 
provides certam exceptions and traps for the less wary For 
example, a financmg statement improperly filed will still operate 
agamst an mdividual with actual knowledge of it, 121 thus dilut-
mg the pure race nature of the system. In addition and more 
proper localities m wluch to file). 
117. See Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 679, 
707 (1995) (argumg that the only purpose of the filing system is to assure secured 
creditors of the pnority mterests given under Article 9). 
118. Id. at 692-704. 
119. See LoPucki, supra note 115, at 15 (discussmg technological improvements m 
the filing system). 
120. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, -312 (listing creditors who take pnority over unperfected 
security mterests and establishmg rules for pnoritizmg among conflicting security 
mterests). 
121. Id. § 9-401(2). 
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consequentially, Article 9 provides special rules to favor pur-
chase money financmg, assurmg, so the argument goes, that one 
lender will not enJOY monopoly power over the debtor.122 Fur-
ther, m some circumstances, the article deems certam creditors 
automatically perfected, without any necessity of a filing. 123 
That means that automatic perfection may, on the nght facts, 
prevail over a security mterest perfected by filing. 124 In other 
mstances, "secret liens" operate m favor of mdividuals who have 
not been the first to file or perfect m the proper venue. 125 
Large mstitutional creditors, the group that Scott argues is m 
the best position to mfluence the revis10n of Article 9, 126 en-
gage m many forms of secured and unsecured lending. Some of 
the secured lending is "purchase money," and other port10ns of a 
particular bank's portfolio may mvolve unsecured loans, workmg 
capital loans secured by all or only a portion of the tangible and 
mtangible assets of a debtor. As a result, the form of both the 
lending and the collateral will determme, from one case to the 
next, which Article 9 rules will operate. To the extent that a rule 
reduces the lender's nsk m some loans but does so at the ex-
pense of competing creditor mterests, that same rule may m-
crease the lender's nsk m the next deal and thereby the cost of 
that loan. 
Professor Gillette recogmzed this key to the failure of Scott's 
test of mterest group impact on the Article 9 revis10n process: "I 
have some quibble with the mherent assumption that the world 
can easily be divided mto camps of secured and unsecured credi-
tors or occasional creditors and financial msiders such that 
members of each camp share the same mterests."127 The foot-
note accompanymg that text is telling: 
i22. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Prior-
ities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-75 (1979) (discussing situational 
monopoly and the purchase money pnority). 
123. u.c.c. §§ 9-302(2)-(4), -304 to -305. 
124. Id. § 9-312. 
125. See LoPuclo, supra note 115, at 7-9 (discussing filings that remain effective 
even though they cannot be discovered in a search). 
126. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1786-87. 
127. Clayton P Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L. REV. 
1853, 1857 (1994). 
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The mterests of those who take purchase money security 
mterests or who are more likely to be purchasers of chattel 
paper will vary from the mterests of general financers who 
take wraparound security mterests. Thus, any complete m-
terest group theory will have to account for the way conflicts 
among these groups are treated m the reVIs1on process.128 
Insofar as Scott's prennse that large mstitut10nal creditors occu-
py one transactional position and benefit from rules that favor 
that position at the expense of those occupymg other posi-
tions129 relies on his mcomplete appreciation of large mstitu-
tional creditors' loan portfolios, the conclusions proceeding from 
that prennse are necessarily flawed. Consideration of Scott's 
particular conclusions about the operation of the filing system 
revisions with respect to purchase money security mterests and 
proceeds of collateral reveals the fatal flaw 
In the section of his article captioned "Filing, PMSis, and 
Proceeds,"130 Scott describes the Article 9 Study Group Report 
on the state of the filing system and then compares the propos-
als for reform with his conception of the mterests of large msti-
tutional secured creditors.131 Scott correctly explams that the 
Article 9 Study Group Report on the filing system described 
numerous deficiencies of the extant system.132 He also writes 
that, m response, "the Filing Report recommended a senes of 
revisions, rangmg from wholesale technological reform, to keep-
mg the current system while reqmnng more centralized filing 
practices, such as filing by taxpayer identification number, clan-
fymg the debtor's name reqmrement, and imposmg time limits 
on filing processmg."133 
i28. Id. at 1857 n.9. 
129. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1785-87. 
130. Id. at 1829. 
131. Id. at 1829-38. 
132. Id. at 1829-30. 
133. Id. In the footnote accompanymg that text, Scott somewhat cryptically and cu-
nously observes that "neither the mmutes nor the correspondence of the Study 
Group mdicate that its members ever questioned the assumption that the concerns 
enumerated m the Filing Report cause real hardship for secured creditors." Id. at 
1830 n.140. Is Scott suggesting that deficiencies m the status quo do not compro-
mise the efficiency and reliability of the system? Would not any deficiency that un-
dermmes the certamty of the system necessarily mcrease nsk and therefore mcrease 
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Scott opmes that the Study Group could have recommended 
one of "two polar alternatives"134-a remforcement of the role 
of the filing system at the expense of the pnmary secured credi-
tors who, Scott concludes, would subsidize the expensive im-
provements or, alternatively, the elimmation of public filing 
altogether.135 Scott then explams that the Study Group Report 
advocated a middle ground-a compromise-Scott asserts, that 
1s best explamed by his mterest group analysis.136 The com-
promise expands "the existing categones of exemptions from 
some or all of the filing rules so long as the benefits of the 
larger exemptions accrue to members of the [dominant mterest 
group, large mstitutional secured creditors]."137 Scott never 
makes clear why these powerful mterest groups did not simply 
use all of their resources to abrogate the filing system altogeth-
er.138 Such a result occurred m the promulgation of Article 2A, 
when the ostensible ownership issues were before the draftmg 
committee, and the final product mcluded no filing reqmrement 
whatsoever.139 
B. Choice of Law 
Scott offers the Study Group recommendations concermng 
ch01ce of law as a "clear example"140 of the type of relatively 
precise rule mdicative of mterest group capture.141 Currently, 
the correct office for filing purposes, though of critical impor-
tance to the secured party, 142 can be difficult to deternnne.143 
the cost of all secured transactions m which filing matters? The pomt is not that 
deficiencies of the filing system cause hardship for secured creditors but rather that 
they burden the secured credit system and thereby cause hardship for all creditors. 
Debtors are also affected because they will pay more for credit than they would if 
the security system was more reliable. 
134. Id. at 1830. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 1830-31. 
137. Id. at 1832. 
138. See id. at 1831 n.144 (discussmg the mcentive structure m public and pnvate 
disclosure systems). 
139. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1994). 
140. Scott, supra note 4, at 1826. 
141. Id. 
142. If the secured party files m the wrong place or not m all of the places re-
qwred by the UCC, the security mterest will remam unperfected. In re Walker, 142 
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The first thmg to decide is the state m which the secured party 
must file a financmg statement.144 The answer to this-question 
is found m the conflict-of-laws rules of section 9-103.145 This 
section consists of six subsections, each of which contams the 
conflict-of-laws provision for a particular type of collateral.146 
The primary rule for tangible collateral with a relatively perma-
nent situs is that the law of the Jurisdiction m which the collat-
-eral is located governs perfection and the effect of perfection.147 
On its face, such a rule seems srmple enough. The secured 
party must only determme where the collateral is located and 
then comply with that Jurisdiction's perfection reqmrements.148 
Such a rule, though simple, is not satisfactory; the various types 
B.R. 484, 485 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (construmg the filing reqwrement stnctly). 
The general rule 15 that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by thlS Act a security agree-
ment 15 effective according to its terms between the parties, agamst purchasers of 
the collateral and agamst creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Despite the general rule, an un-
perfected security mterest is unenforceable against most third parties because the 
number of exceptions to the general rule have, m fact, gobbled up the rule. See, e.g., 
U.C.C. § 9-301 (listing persons who take pnority over an unperfected security mter-
est); see also 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (1994) (declanng that the bankruptcy trustee 
prevails over secured creditors whose interests are unperfected on the date of 
bankruptcy). 
143. The number of cases mvolvmg an allegedly misfiled imancmg statement re-
ported m a UCC reporting service exceeds 200. 26 ·u.c.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) §§ 
9401.26-.27 (1989 & Supp. 1995). 
144. After the secured party resolves the "whlch state" question, she must deter-
mme the proper office or offices withm the state with whlch to file the financmg 
statement. UCC § 9-401(1) offers each adopting state the choice of three alternative 
prov1s1ons that fix the place to file. U.C.C. § 9-401(1). Depending on whlch prov1s1on 
a state adopts, the answer to the "where m the state" question could depend on the 
debtor's place of residence or busmess, the location of the collateral, or the use of 
the collateral. Id. Because Scott ignores the Study Group's position on thls second 
question, th15 Article will do the same. 
145. Id. § 9-103. 
146. The six categories of collateral are: (1) documents, mstruments, and ordinary 
goods; (2) goods covered by a certificate of title; (3) accounts, general mtangibles, 
and mobile goods; (4) chattel paper; (5) minerals; and (6) mvestment property. Id. 
147. Id. Section 9-103(1)(b) provides that: 
Id. 
Except as otherwise provided m thls subsection, perfection and the effect 
of perfection or non-perfection of a security interest m collateral are gov-
erned by the law of the JUnsdiction where the collateral is when the last 
event occurs on whlch is based the assertion that the security mterest is 
perfected or unperfected. 
148. Id. 
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of collateral covered by section 9-103(1) have a relatively fixed 
location but are nevertheless capable of movement. 149 There-
fore, section 9-103(1) combmes a temporal test with a location 
test. The statute also tells the secured party to determine the 
location of the collateral when "the last event occurs on which is 
based the assertion that the security mterest is perfected or 
unperfected."150 This provis10n is the so-called ''last event" 
test.151 
The Study Group Report recommended applymg the law of 
the Jurisdiction where the debtor is located.152 It did so for sev-
eral reasons. First, the Study Group focused on the benefits of 
having a smgle choice-of-law rule. 153 For example, a smgle rule 
will obviate the need for a secured party to make multiple filings 
m many cases m which such filings are now necessary 154 One 
problem with current section 9-103 anses when the debtor does 
busmess m more than one Jurisdiction. A secured party who 
wishes to perfect a security mterest m the debtor's mventory 
and accounts must now file both where the mventory is locat-
ed155 and where the debtor is located. 156 This double filing 
would not be necessary m a one-rule regime. 157 
149. See id. § 9-103(1) (covenng "[d]ocuments, mstruments, and ordinary goods"). 
150. Id. § 9-103(1)(b). 
151. The potential ambiguity of the last event test can make its application ex-
traordinarily difficult. For example, must the last event be one of the statutory 
events required for perfection? The review group that analyzed the ISsue said "no," 
charactenzmg the requirement as an "all events" test. FINAL REPORT, supra note 
113, at 78. For an overview of the last event test, see David Frisch, U.C.C. Filings: 
Changing Circumstances Can Make a Right Filing Wrong. But Can They Make a 
Wrong Filing Right?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1263-71 (1983). The Study Group 
waffles on whether any form of the last event test deserves mclus1on m the new 
Article 9. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 78-79. 
152. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 74. The report recommends that the "loca-
tion of the collateral" be retained for those mstances m which the secured party 
perfects by possession. Id. 
153. Id. at 75. 
154. Id. 
155. u.c.c. § 9-103(1) (1994). 
156. To perfect a security mterest m accounts, the UCC requires a filing m the JU-
nsdiction where the debtor IS located. Id. § 9-103(3). 
157. In addition, gomg to a smgle rule will make it easier for a secured party to 
claim a continuously perfected security mterest m proceeds without having to make 
a second filing. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 75. 
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Further, because debtors change location less often than does 
collateral, one consequence of a rule that turns on the location of 
the debtor will be a reduction of the burden of alertness present-
ly imposed upon secured parties.158 No longer will a secured 
party run the nsk of losmg its perfected security mterest 
through the mterstate shuffling or movement of goods by the 
debtor or third parties. 159 Changmg the baseline rule thus may 
decrease the secured party's overall costs. 
In makmg the case for his mterest group model, Scott may 
well be correct when he states that the location of the debtor 
rule is "cheaper for a pnmary lender."160 General financiers, 
however, may not be the only wmners if this rule change is 
adopted. When facmg a complex task such as predictmg the be-
havior of buyers and creditors, the absence of systematic and 
well-controlled data and a dependence on casually asserted 
myths about the system are hinderances. 
Consider, for example, the implications of the Study Group's 
recommendation for purchasers of discrete goods. Scott assumes 
that their costs will mcrease.161 One rmght, however, conclude 
otherwise. Under current section 9-103(1)(d), if a secured party 
properly perfects its security mterest under the law of the place 
where the collateral is located when the relevant last event 
occurs, the ongmal filing remams effective for up to four months 
after the debtor takes the goods to another state. 162 If the se-
cured party refiles m the removal state within this statutory 
grace penod, the security mterest will contmue perfected with-
out interruption.163 
A maJor consequence of the four-month rule is that fraudulent 
debtors can go a long way towards makmg a filing disappear 
simply by takmg goods across state lines. An innocent purchaser 
wishing to buy the collateral thus must assure herself that the 
goods have been m-state for at least four months without a 
filing, or she must check (assurmng this mformation can some-
158. Id. at 76-77. 
159. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanymg text. 
160. Scott, supra note 4, at 1828. 
161. Id. 
162. u.c.c. § 9-103(1)(d)(i) (1994). 
163. Id. § 9-103(1)(d)(ii). 
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how be obtamed) for a filing m every state where the debtor 
does or has done busmess. If a location-of-the-debtor rule be-
comes effective m the revision of section 9-103(1), this problem, 
for the most part, will go away 164 
On the one hand, purchasers might mcur greater expenses by 
searching for a filing "in a potentially distant location."165 On 
the other hand, if the proposed rule change reduces the likeli-
hood that the debtor will be able to mislead purchasers, their 
costs might be less. 166 In sum, no one has the data necessary to 
draw mtellectually defensible conclusions about ''who wms" and 
"who loses" if the Code switches to a location-of-the-debtor rule. 
In fact, askmg such a question can easily produce meamngless 
or misleading answers. 
C. Purchase Money Security Interests 
In considenng the Study Group's suggestions concermng pur-
chase money security mterests (PMSI), Scott agam mamtams 
that he has uncovered evidence of mterest group power.167 His 
claims about PMSis can be summed up m two related asser-
tions: (1) the direct costs and deficiencies of the filing system 
provide an mcentive for pnmary or dominant creditors to opt out 
of the system by relymg on pnvate disclosure, 168 and (2) the 
164. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 76 ("[D]ebtors are unlikely to change 
locations as frequently as collateral does."). 
165. Scott, supra note 4, at 1828. Even tlus conclus10n 1s highly speculative. An 
obVIous first step m any analyslS of whether a purchaser's costs will mcrease, de-
crease, or remain the same 1s to study the relevant class to see what percentage of 
potential purchasers will actually use the filing system. In some instances, a pur-
chaser would be better off by not searching. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (proVIding that a 
m15filed financmg statement 15 nonetheless effective "agamst any person who has 
knowledge of the contents of such financmg statement"). Second, one must know who 
conducts searches (e.g., purchasers, attorneys, or pnvate search firms) and how their 
costs compare. Finally, questions remain as to how the choice of filing office affects 
those costs. Each issue 1s worthy of senous attention. 
166. Even now, a purchaser of goods may have to search for filings where the 
debtor 15 located if the goods are "mobile goods" under § 9-103(3) or if the purchaser 
1s unsure of their classification. In fact, m the latter case, a prudent purchaser 
would be WISe to search where the goods are located (the rule for ordinary goods) 
and where the debtor 1s located (the rule for mobile goods). 
167. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1832-35. 
168. See id. at 1829-32. 
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recommendations offered by the Study Group would permit more 
of these financial ms1ders to escape from the Code's first-m-time 
pnority rule by makmg it easier for them to achieve purchase 
money status.169 
This view seems rather confusmg and probably not entirely 
consistent. In discussmg the recommendations concermng ch01ce 
of law, Scott refers to general financiers as the dommant class of 
secured creditors170 and seems to adopt the Study Group's con-
clus10n that 
the location of the debtor rule has offsetting costs that must 
be borne by other creditors, such as purchase money 
financers of discrete goods, who must now file m the state 
where the debtor is located (which is a more problematic 
exercise than filing where the newly acqmred collateral is 
located).171 
On this view, 1f understood correctly, no gams by PMSI credi-
tors should result if those gams would be detnmental to the 
mterests of pnmary lenders.172 In contrast, if PMSI creditors 
are the ones who exercised the greatest mfluence over the 
Study Group, then Scott would have to explam why the sug-
gested conflicts rules look the way that they do. Quite a differ-
ent possibility 1s that these two mterest groups were m compe-
tition. Where, then, are the vague general standards predicted 
by Scott's model?173 
169. At the end of lus critique of the PMSI rev1s1ons, Scott claims that "[t]he ef-
fects are twofold. First, firms are likely to rely mcreasingly on pnvate disclosure as 
a substitute method of policing against debtor rmsbehav1or. Second, the costs of the 
filing system are increasingly externalized from pnmary or dormnant creditors to 
less informed or 'occasional' creditors." Id. at 1834-35. Scott ignores the fact that, if 
the PMSI is m inventory, the PMSI creditor must continue to rely on the filing 
system for information about pnor claims because such claimants must receive notice 
before delivery of the goods to the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3). 
170. Scott, supra note 4, at 1827. 
171. Id. at 1828. 
172. Because a PMSI creditor will be able to gam pnority over pnor creditors with 
floating liens, U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4), a rule that benefits the former will almost al-
ways come at the expense of pnmary lenders. This analysis assumes that lenders 
who engage m general financmg are not also substantially engaged in purchase 
money financing, a conclusion that Scott apparently takes for granted. 
173. At one point, Scott does acknowledge that PMSI creditors are in competition 
with other creditors and claims that the Study Group's unwillingness to recommend 
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Despite the mdispensability of current Judicial and statutory 
trends as an mgredient m makmg sense of the Study Group 
Report, direct consideration of this data is absent from Scott's 
discussion. The Study Group's proposal to revise sections 9-
301(2) and 9-312(4) to extend the grace period for perfectmg 
PMSis from ten to twenty days provides one illustration of how 
the absence of this mformation might lead to distorted 
mferences.174 The Final Report explams that "[a]t least 34 
states have amended § 9-301(2), § 9-312(4), or both, so as to 
extend the 'grace penod' for achieving PMSI priority from 10 
days to 20 days. In addition, two states have extended each 
period to 15 days and two others have extended each period to 
21 days."175 Irorucally, this trend suggests that, if there is a po-
litical story of mterest group pressure to tell, it unfolded across 
the country m public, not pnvate legislatures.176 
D. Proceeds 
Scott thinks that, like its treatment of PMSis, the Final 
Report's treatment of proceeds gives the reader a meanmgful 
grasp of the political dynarmc.177 The purpose of this Article is 
not to mterpret the evidence but to illustrate several additional 
sorts of evidence-seemingly more than baseless conclusion or 
mere anecdote but, on examination, no more mformative.178 
a default formula for the allocation of payments to a creditor with a PMS! and a 
non-PMS! security mterest m the same collateral IS consistent with the prediction of 
his model. Scott, supra note 4, at 1834 n.155. He does not explam why, if there is 
competition among classes of creditors, there are bnght-line rules favorable to PMS! 
creditors on other issues. While these are difficult policy questions, his model does 
not seem to settle the matter. 
174. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 103. 
175. Id. 
176. Indeed, a pomt rarely written about, but one that Scott must heed, IS that, m 
all Article 9 drafts pnor to 1956, the 10-day grace penod was applicable to both m-
ventory and non-mventory PMSls. 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 29.5, at 799 (1965). Therefore, questionmg whether the Code's 
treatment of purchase money lenders has improved over time may lead to widely 
divergent assertions. 
177. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1835 ("Here, the Study Group recommendations 
work to enhance the favorable position granted to general financmg creditors by 
expanding their ability to mamtam their first-m-time pnority m proceeds."). 
178. Answers to most questions about the behavior of the secured credit system are 
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What is rmportant to know about the current scope of the 
term "proceeds" under section 9-306 is that it has a transaction-
al focus. The secured party obtams a security mterest m any-
thmg received upon the "sale, exchange, collection or other dis-
position of' the collateral.179 Accordingly, courts have taken the 
position that the debtor must have transferred title to the collat-
eral before an asset can be classified as proceeds of that collat-
eral. 180 This requirement has led to a senes of dec1s1ons that 
have derued. proceeds status to such items as lease pay-
ments, 181 cash dividends,182 and vanous kmds of farm 
subsidies.183 
mherently statistical. For this reason, the evidence that this Article adds to the 
debate permits only the loosest and weakest of mferences about the matters that the 
Authors are trymg to understand. Yet illummating the unknowns m the system can 
aid m the development of a research agenda for obtammg the good and complete 
data needed. 
179. u.c.c. § 9-306(1) (1994). 
180. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E]ach of the fore-
gomg events describes an event whereby one asset lS disposed of and another is 
acqmred as its substitute."). 
181. See, e.g., In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1991); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Cleary Bros. Constr. Co. (In re Cleary 
Bros. Constr. Co.), 9 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). But see Investment Hotel 
Properties, Ltd. v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Investment Hotel Prop-
erties, Ltd.), 109 B.R. 990 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding that payment for the use 
of hotel rooms is proceeds); John Deere Indus. Eqmp. Co. v. Southern Eqmp. Sales 
Co. (In re Southern Eqmp. Sales Co.), 24 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (holding 
that the term "proceeds" mcludes rents). The Permanent Editonal Board for the 
UCC has taken the position that the nght to receive rentals is proceeds. 
Where a debtor has granted to a secured party a security mterest m 
goods that the debtor later leases as lessor, the lease rentals would con-
stitute proceeds of the secured party's collateral for the reason that the 
debtor's conveyance of a leasehold mterest m the goods constitutes a 
disposition of the goods for purposes of § 9-306(1). 
PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY NO. 9, 
FINAL DRAFT, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at 1 (June 5, 1992). 
182. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042. Courts have drawn a distinction between 
an ordinary cash dividend and a liqmdating dividend. The latter would seem to be 
proceeds. See, e.g., Aycock v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 127 B.R. 17 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1991). 
183. Most of the cases m this area have mvolved the federal payment-m-kmd (PIK) 
program. Under this program, a farmer agrees not to grow crops on a certain per-
centage of his land and receives, m exchange for that promise, a governmental pay-
ment m kmd of the foregone crops. See In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561, 561-62 (8th 
Cir. 1984). The question IS whether the PIK payment or payments under similar 
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The Final Report proposes a dual conception of proceeds that 
would encompass all vaneties of assets. First, the Code would 
address the "exchange and replacement'' cases.184 Proceeds 
would mclude anything "received m place of and m substitution 
for the ongmal collateral, which has been disposed of or reduced 
m value (such as by collections)."185 Under this standard, the 
secured party presumably would have a claim to lease rentals 
and to the debtor's tort and warranty claims.186 The second 
category of cases are the "close association" cases.187 These sit-
uations would mvolve "all forms of distributions on account of 
securities, partnership mterests, goveTIIment subsidies, and 
other payments that do not mvolve an 'exchange."'188 The 
Study Group would treat these receipts as proceeds because 
they are "so necessarily and obVIously associated with an mter-
est m the ongmal collateral that a security agreement and 
financmg statement ought not to be reqmred to mention them 
explicitly "189 
Within this area, Scott's argument that general financmg 
creditors dommate the Article 9 reVIsIOn process has some mitial 
plausibility Adoption of the Study Group recommendations and 
the resulting expansion of the conception of proceeds surely will 
redound to the benefit of some general financiers and will, as 
Scott suggests, have some impact on the mtegrity of the filing 
system.190 As this Article has mdicated, however, the recom-
mendat10ns can be meamngless or rmsleading if exarmned with-
out reference to context. Scott has taken m too little of the pie-
programs are proceeds of the crop that never eXISted. Most courts have held that it 
is not. See, e.g., In re Kingsley, 865 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Binmng, 45 B.R. 
9 (Bankr. S.D. Oh10 1984). 
184. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 110-11. 
185. Id. at 110. 
186. Id. Although a tort claim nnght qualify as proceeds under section 9-306(1), it 
currently could not be the subject of a valid security mterest because Article 9 ex-
cludes tort claims. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1994). The Study Group has suggested that 
Article 9 mclude "security interests m claims (other than claims for personal mJury) 
ansmg out of tort, to the extent that such claims are assignable under applicable 
non-UCC law." FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 58. 
187. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 111. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Scott, supra note 4, at 1836-37. 
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ture. To understand the system better, one should consider the 
followmg: 
1. The Study Group did not go as far as it rmght have. For ex-
ample, the Final Report reJects the idea that a construction 
contractor's accounts might be proceeds of the construction 
eqmpment used on the Job.191 At least one commentator has 
cntic1zed tills posit10n as "placmg a formalistic and commercially 
unJustified limitation upon the scope of the term 'proceeds."'192 
2. D1saggregat1on of the reported cases mto subcategones re-
veals that the typical proceeds claimant is not the powerful 
general financier envisioned by Scott but rather a PMSI or mex-
penenced creditor who failed to describe the proceeds m the 
security agreement and financmg statement.193 
3. Along with the suggested reconceptualization of the term 
"proceeds" are proposals that would confirm and arguably en-
large the protection now afforded to tmrd parties who acqmre 
cash proceeds. 194 
191. FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 111 n.16 ("At some pomt, the acquisition of 
assets by a debtor, m part as a result of a dimmution m value of collateral, will be 
too attenuated for those assets to be considered proceeds."). 
192. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethmkmg Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and 
Revision of the U.C.C. Section 9-306, 69 TUI,. L. REV. 645, 701 (1995) (emphasIS 
added). 
193. See, e.g., In re Tn-State Eqwp., Inc., 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986); Appliance 
Buyers Credit Corp. v. Perrotto Refngeration, Inc. (In re Perrotto Refrigeration, Inc.), 
38 B.R. 284 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Territo (In re Territo), 
32 B.R. 377 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Rogers, 6 B.R. 472 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 
1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Boston, 564 P.2d 964 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). If the court 
does not charactenze a subsequently acquired asset as proceeds, it will nevertheless 
be subject to the creditor's security mterest if the security agreement adequately de-
scribes it. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1994) (permitting a security agreement to provide 
for a security mterest m after-acquired collateral). Consider, for example, PIK pay-
ments. If a secured party described this property along with the anticipated crops to 
be grown, the proceeds issue would never arise. Indeed, even m those mstances m 
which the proceeds are outside the scope of Article 9, a secured party can usually 
acquire an mterest m the item by some other means. For example, a common-law 
assignment of a tort claim may be effective. 
194. Courts often apply common-law rules of negotiability to protect good faith 
purchasers of cash proceeds. See, e.g., ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Cullen (In re 
Antinarelli Enters., Inc.), 94 B.R. 227 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). Official Comment 2(c) 
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4. A statutory expansion of the definition of the term "proceeds" 
rmght, m some cases, directly benefit unsecured creditors. For 
example, a Mame statute provides that a Judicial lien can reach 
the proceeds of a debtor's property only if a secured party would 
be able to reach those same proceeds under section 9-306.195 
The preceding sampler should convey the flavor of the prob-
lem. Without accurate pictures of the factual underpmnmgs, 
debates about the Article 9 revision process cannot proceed 
usefully 
to current § 9-306 reads: 
Where cash proceeds are covered mto the debtor's checkmg account 
and paid out m the operation of the debtor's busmess, rec1p1ents of the 
funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may have 
m them as proceeds. What has been said relates to payments and trans-
fers m ordinary course. 
U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2(c); see also PEB CO!\iMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COl\iMERCIAL 
CODE, PEB CO!\iMENTARIES 1-7, FINAL DRAFT, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan), at 33 
(Mar. 10, 1990) (discussmg the relative pnorities of security mterests m the cash 
proceeds of accounts). The Study Group would delete the "ordinary course" limitation 
m the comment and revise it to "make clear that a good faith purchaser for value of 
cash proceeds or of funds from a deposit account contammg cash proceeds cuts off a 
security mterest m the cash proceeds to the extent that the purchaser would take 
free of other claims to the property." FINAL REPORT, supra note 113, at 121-22. 
Although the foregomg recommendation may be simply a restatement of current 
law, a compamon recommendation may have the effect of changmg it, to the prej-
udice of the pnmary lender. One common effort m recent years has been to find a 
consequence-onented approach for resolving postdefault conflicts between competing 
security mterests. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne et al., Junior Creditors' Realization on 
Debtors' Equity Under U.C.C. Section 9-311: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 1905 (1989). Although Article 9 explicitly env1s1ons the existence of Jumor secu-
rity mterests m collateral, see U.C.C. § 9-504(3), it presently is silent on many of 
the issues raised m connection with the JUmor creditor's enforcement. One topic that 
has generated extensive discussion concerns the 1umor creditor's nght to retam pro-
ceeds ansmg from the disposition of collateral under § 9-504 or collections from ac-
count debtors and other obligors under § 9-502. The Study Group has proposed that 
the JUmor creditor has no obligation to apply the proceeds of collection or other 
disposition to a debt secured by a semor lien on the collateral. FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 113, at 216-22. Although general prmc1ples of negotiability might Justify this 
rule change, it may have a profound impact on developmg case law. See, e.g., Con-
solidated Equip. Sales, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 627 P.2d 432 (Okla. 
1981) (finding that a JUmor secured party has an obligation to turn proceeds of the 
sale of the collateral over to the semor secured party). 
195. See New England Mortgage Servs. Co. v. Petit, 590 A.2d 1054 (Me. 1991) (ap-
plymg ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3131(9) (West Supp. 1990)). 
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V CONCLUSION 
As the foregomg argument demonstrates, the Authors are 
uneasy with metatheory that reduces complex human mterac-
tion to the head of a pm. Any assertion of the madequacies of 
the commercial lawmakmg process is mappropnate without 
cons1denng the realities of that process and without commg to 
terms with the JUTisprudential foundations that mform the Um-
form Commercial Code. This mqmry has revealed the rmpreci-
s10n of Scott's conclus10ns and has suggested that his under-
standing of the competmg mterests m the Article 9 filing regime 
is, at best, mcomplete. 
The greatest benefit of theones like the one proposed by Scott 
is that they remmd us of the extent to which thinkmg about 
commercial law is dependent upon emp1ncally validated models 
of the lawmakmg process.196 The absence of a reliable model of 
the behaVIor of the legislative system leaves us m a poor posi-
tion to evaluate recons1derat10ns of that system. Even if all 
agreed on the values and goals of commercial law, no sound 
basis exists for concluding that abandomng the current system, 
finding ways to make that system more efficient, or retaimng 
the current system would make the attainment of those goals 
more likely 
196. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY 
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 336 (1989) ("To advocate law reforms without a 
shred of evidence about how the system currently works, who is likely to be affect-
ed, and how those effects may reverberate throughout the system is breathtakmgly 
negligent."). 
